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This paper employed a variety of sources of data and a number of methods to describe
rural lending markets. Over the sample period, 1992 through 1998, there was a pronounced
trend towards affiliation of banks, both urban and rural, with holding companies, although
over this period there was little change in the concentration of banking offices in rural
areas. Using data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, the study
found some evidence that rural small businesses were less likely to apply for a loan than
urban small firms although those rural firms that did apply were more likely to have their
application accepted.
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The purpose of this paper is to review data
regarding banking consolidation with a partic-
ular focus on rural areas. The general theme
of the paper is that rural markets and financial
institutions may differ fundamentally from ur-
ban ones. Thus one should perhaps distinguish
these markets when examining some of the ef-
fects of consolidation on the borrowers in a
market area. For instance, the number and type
of banks that operate in rural areas may differ
significant y from the norm for urban markets.
Also, rural borrowers may differ fundamen-
tally from urban borrowers, and if this is true,
the type of financial relationships that they
maintain also might differ. I plan to carry out
this examination of consolidation in rural
banking markets by developing the three ma-
jor themes outlined below.
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In the first part of the paper I plan to doc-
ument the incidence and character of structural
changes in rural banking markets relative to
their urban counterparts. Using data from the
National Information Center (NIC) database,’
I identified 3780 instances of structural change
among commercial banks in the United States
from January 1992 until September 1998 in
which a banking charter disappeared. These
changes encompassed structural changes
among both urban and rural commercial banks
and among independent banks as well as bank
holding companies. The acquired institution
may have become a branch of the purchasing
bank or banking subsidiary or it may have
been closed. Note that I included the closing
of a banking office only when the closure was
a part of the consolidation; that is, I did not
include closing of branches that had been op-
1A version of the National Information Center
(NIC) database is available at www.ffiec.gov/nic/
deafult.htm. The FDIC also maintains structure infor-
mation at www2.fdic.gov/structur/search/ and WWW2.
fdic.govlidl.202 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 1999
erated for a time after the date of consolida-
tion.
1 also identified 3820 instances of change
in the control of subsidiaries of bank holding
companies. These changes can either reflect
purchases of subsidiaries or independent banks
by a top holding company or the purchase of
one top holding company by another.
Throughout the paper an urban bank or sub-
sidiary is one that is located in a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA), and its market area is
taken as the entire MSA. A rural bank or sub-
sidiary has its headquarters outside a MSA,
and its market area is the county of the head-
quarters of the bank or banking subsidiary.z I
combine these cases of structural transactions
with data from the quarterly reports of con-
dition (Call reports) to characterize the finan-
cial condition of both the target and acquiring
institutions,
In the second section of the paper I develop
the notion that structural activity in a banking
market need not necessarily lead to more con-
centration. For instance, if a bank holding com-
pany acquires banking entities in a market
where previously it had not operated, then it is
not immediately clear whether or not that mar-
ket will become more concentrated. Indeed, im-
mediately following such a transaction the most
common measure of the competitiveness of a
market, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI),
which is the sum of the squared market shares
of all the competitors in the market, would re-
main unchanged. Similarly, the conversion of
a bank or a banking subsidiary into a branch
does not automatically increase the HHI, and,
in a more intuitive sense, if the banking office
remains open under the control of a bank that
previously was not in the market it is not clear
whether customers in the banking market have
their choices restricted.
I plan to document the concentration aris-
ing from structural reorganization of banks by
looking at changes in the HHI calculated from
2Keeton (1996) found that acquisitions by out-of-
state bank holding companies reduced the levels of
lending by the subsidiary that was acquired. Out-of-
state acquisitions are not distinguished from others in
the cument paper.
the deposits originating in each banking mar-
ket. In this part of the paper, rural banks, sub-
sidiaries, or branches are those located outside
MS AS, although I list as rural a rural subsid-
iary or branch that is controlled by an urban
holding company. While it is almost tautolog-
ically true that rural markets have a higher
HHI than urban markets, it does not follow
that the degree of concentration given by this
measure has risen significantly in recent years
in rural markets.
A final difference between urban and rural
lending markets likely lies in the financial
characteristics of the potential borrowers in
each market. I use data from the Federal Re-
serve’s 1993 Survey of Small Business Fi-
nances to examine differences between urban
and rural small businesses and their financing.
In this part of the paper, rural borrowers are
taken to be those where the main offices of
the business are outside a MSA.
The Incidence of Structural Change in
Banking Markets
Structural changes were identified as a change
in any one of several parts of the NIC database
for a commercial bank. First, a banking charter
can disappear as a result of a bank merger.
Second, a bank holding company may pur-
chase some of the subsidiaries of another bank
holding company, changing the control of the
subsidiary but otherwise leaving the charter
unchanged. Finally, a bank or bank holding
company may purchase a bank holding com-
pany (and all of its subsidiaries) changing only
the holding company structure but not the
character of individual subsidiary banks.
Counting these three types of structural trans-
actions, 7600 instances of structural change
occurred during 1992 through September
1998, and 3488 of these transactions involved
rural targets, either independent banks or sub-
sidiaries. I consider only targets that were
commercial banks, although acquirers may be
other banks, thrifts, savings banks, bank hold-
ing companies, or nonbank holding compa-
nies.
Figure 1 shows the rate of structural change
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Figure 1. The incident of urban and rural
consolidation*
rural targets. Roughly 45 percent of all bank
merger activity during this period has involved
rural targets, and the proportion of mergers
with rural targets has remained fairly constant
over that period, even though rural banks ac-
count for only about one third of the number
of commercial banks. Because rural banks
tend to be more profitable than urban banks of
a similar size, rural markets might be expected
to attract entrants (as discussed in Rhoades
1995 and elsewhere), and some of this entry
might manifest itself in a higher rate of con-
solidation as entrants buy up existing banking
operations.
Table 1 displays the means of several char-
acteristics of urban and rural targets of take-
overs, as well as a simple t-test of the differ-
ence in the means of the characteristics.q
7Test for the equality of the variance for urban ver-
Roughly three fourths of both urban and rural
targets were affiliated with a bank holding
company before the merger, and although ur-
ban targets were slightly more likely to be in
holding companies before the merger, the dif-
ference was statistically insignificant. Urban
targets were significantly larger than rural tar-
gets. The return on assets (ROA) was signifi-
cantly lower for urban targets than for rural
ones over the sample period, although this re-
sult obscures a rather pronounced tendency
early in the sample period (1992 to 1994) for
rural banks to have significantly higher ROAS
than urban banks, while in the last few years,
the difference has been insignificant. This di-
vergence over the period under study almost
exactly mirrors the results for the delinquency
rate, which is significantly lower for rural tar-
gets in 1992 through 1994. Finally, rural banks
that were acquired held a significantly lower
fraction of their assets as loans than urban
banks that were acquired.
Although, as mentioned above, both urban
and rural targets tended to be members of
bank holding companies, the prevalence of
this type of organizational structure has grown
much more quickly for rural banks than for
urban banks in recent years. Looking through
the data from the Call reports, about 73 per-
cent of commercial banks with headquarters in
rural areas were members of holding compa-
susruraitargetsindicatedthatsome of thet-statistics
were not strictlyvalid. Nevertheless,approximatet-
testson the differencesbetweencharacteristics of ur-
ban and ruraltargetsassumingthatthe variancedif-
feredbetweenurbanandruraltargetswereconsistent
withtheregulart-tests.
Table 1. Average of Financial Variables and Characteristics of Targets of Acquisitions 1992–
T-statistic for
Variable Urban Banks Rural Banks difference
BHC Member (percent) 74.3 73.5 0.8
Assets (million dollars) 732 87 91**
ROA (percent) 0.75 1.00 –2.2*
Delinquent/Total Loans (percent) 3.5 3.1 4.8**
Total Loans/Assets (percent) 58.1 54.7 9.4**
** Statistically significant at the 1-percent Ieve[.
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Figure 2. Percentiles of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for rural and urban banks,
1992 and 1997
nies in June of 1992, compared with about 61
percent of banks located in urban areas. By
June of 1998, almost 80 percent of rural banks
were members of holding companies, while
the comparable figure for urban banks was
about 63 percent. This simple look at bank
structure does not distinguish membership in
smaller bank holding companies from mem-
bership in large, multi-state organizations, and
it may reflect lingering effects of older state
laws against bank branching that have been
removed in recent years. Nevertheless, the dif-
ference between the typical organizational
structure of rural versus urban banks and its
increasing magnitude is notable.
Changing Concentration in Urban and
Rural Banking Markets
Rural areas, by their very nature, often offer
fewer alternative sources of goods and servic-
es than urban areas. It seems likely that finan-
cial services also flow to rural areas through
fewer outlets. Indeed as may be seen in the
second bar in Figure 2, in mid-1997 (the most
recent period for which the data are available)
the HHI, which for these banking data is taken
as the sum of the squared share of total de-
posits in each banking market,4 was 10,000 for
more than five percent of rural counties (about
110 counties). Furthermore, some rural coun-
ties contained no banking institution, and thus
were excluded from this analysis. In 1997, the
median HHI for rural markets was 3231, or on
a numbers-equivalent basis,~ the median was
roughly three commercial banks that operated
in each rural market. Only five percent of rural
banking markets had an HHI less than 1524
(six and a half commercial banks), The most
concentrated rural markets (taken arbitrarily as
the top 25 percent of the HHI distribution) had
an HHI greater than 4766, or fewer than two
commercial banks per market.
One way of gaining perspective on the rel-
ative degree of concentration in rural banking
markets is to contrast them with their urban
counterparts. As may be seen in the far-right
column, in mid 1997, the median HHI in ur-
ban markets was 1510, or about six and a half
bank institutions per market. The maximum
HHI in urban markets in 1997 was 3227,
which was, coincidentally, roughly equal to
the median value for rural banking markets.
Another perhaps more relevant way of
thinking about the concentration in rural mar-
kets is to look at changes over time in the
HHI. To this end, I chose 1992 as the initial
period for two reasons. First, I hoped that by
this time some of the turmoil arising from ad-
justments in the thrift part of banking markets
might have subsided. Also, this time period
was convenient for a few of the market vari-
ables that I used in the next section with the
4Market shares were calculated by including 100
percent of deposits at commercial banks and mutual
savings banks and 50 percent of the deposits of S&Ls
and federal savings banks. This convention matches
other figures published by the Federal Reserve.
f The numbers-equivalent version of the HHI in
this paper is a rough rule of thumb that represents the
number of equal-sized firms required to yield a given
HHI (Adelman, 1969), It is given by l/( HHI/1000).
The 50-percent weighting of S&Ls and federal savings
banks obscures a btt this interpretation of the HHI.
Also, the assumption of equal-sized firms may cloud
the true picture. For instance, if there are two banks in
a market, the HHI could range from 5000 (equal
shares) to 9802 (one bank having 99 percent of de-
posits and another with one percent).Walraven: Rural Banks Involved in Mergers 205
1993 NSSBF data. I considered two types of
changes over this five-year period: First, I
compared the distribution of the level of the
HHI in rural markets in 1992 to the distribu-
tion of rural markets in 1997, and I compared
it to changes in the HHI in urban markets over
the same interval. Then I compared the distri-
bution of the changes in the HHI within each
market over the 1992–1 995 interval. One
should note that neither of these comparisons
takes account of migration of counties from
urban to rural over the period. This migration
appears to be small and I have assumed that
its effect is negligible,
Comparing the medians in the first and sec-
ond columns of Figure 2, one can see that the
HHI in rural banking markets increased from
3170 to 3231 over this five-year period. Also,
the dispersion, taken here to be the range
spanned by the 10th to the 90th percentiles,
shrank-this range was 1709 to 6984 in 1992,
while it was 1747 to 6726 in 1997. Taken to-
gether these figures suggest that rural banking
markets became a bit more concentrated from
1992 to 1997, although counties towards the
concentrated end of the range saw some im-
provement in the HHI measure of competition.
As may be seen below each column, the mean
HHI in rural markets fell slightly and the stan-
dard deviation decreased as well.
The median HHI for urban markets rose
from 1487 to 1510 during 1992–1995 (third
and fourth column of Figure 2), less than half
the increase seen in rural markets. Although
the range spanned by the 10th to the 90th per-
centiles shrank (as it did for the distribution
of rural banks), almost all of this tightening
reflected an increase in the HHI in more com-
petitive markets-the range was 882 to 2386
in 1992 compared with 978 to 2394 in 1997.
Thus, the more competitive urban banking
markets saw some increase in concentration,
and, indeed, the average HHI in urban banking
markets rose from 1595 to 1642 from 1992 to
1995. This increase in average concentration
in urban banking markets, which amounts to
0.2 banks on a numbers-equivalent basis,
stands in contrast to the slight decrease in con-
centration in rural banking markets. Further-
more, the degree of concentration in the upper
Table 2. Percentiles of the Distribution of the
Percent Change in the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index
Rural Urban








end of the range of urban HHIs edged up a
touch, compared with the considerable decline
in the HHI seen in the most concentrated rural
markets.
A final way of parsing the changes in the
HHI in rural versus urban areas is to examine
the distribution of changes in the HHI in each
banking market, Table 2 gives some percen-
tiles of the percentage changes from 1992 to
1997 in both rural and urban banking markets.
Although the median change for both rural
and urban banking markets was zero, the 95th
percentile of changes in the HHI was almost
twice as large in urban banking markets as in
rural banking markets. By contrast, the degree
of improvement in banking markets where the
HHI fell was roughly the same at each per-
centile that is listed, Articulated another way,
changes in the HHI for rural markets were
fairly evenly distributed about the mean, while
changes in the HHI for urban banking markets
seemed to be skewed towards more concen-
tration.
The NIC database provides an alternative
related way to measure the number of choices
that rural borrowers face. C)n June 30, 1997,
the average number of commercial banks,
thrifts, and savings banks plus branch offices
of any of these types of financial institution
was 9.9 in non metropolitan markets. Thus,
the typical rural borrower had almost 10 bank-
ing offices where he or she might seek some
type of credit. On average, seven of these
banking offices were branches of another in-
stitution and although the head office was usu-
ally in another county (roughly nine times out206 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 1999
of 10) the head office was within the same
state as the branch. Not surprisingly, urban
banking markets had many more banks and
branches—the average number was 1030, al-
though this average was lifted substantially by
the largest cities.
As was the case when the HHI values for
1997 were compared with those from 1992,
there was little substantial change in the com-
plexion of rural banking markets when one
compares the number of offices in 1992 and
1997. On average, there were 9,3 banking of-
fices in each rural banking market in 1992, and
about six of these offices were branches. The
head office of these branches was again usu-
ally in the same state as the branch, and almost
half of the branches had head offices in the
same county as the branch.
Characteristics of Rural Small Business
Borrowers
The preceding sections of the paper have fo-
cussed on the characteristics of rural banking
markets relative to their urban counterparts. I
have documented a number of differences in
the nature of the market itself and of the banks
that are targets of acquisitions. In this section
I compare rural versus urban small business
firms, using data from the Federal Reserve’s
1993 Survey of Small Business Finances
(NSSBF), which was co-sponsored and co-
funded by the Federal Reserve Board and the
U.S. Small Business Administration.G firms
surveyed constitute a nationally representative
sample of small businesses operating in the
United States as of yem-end 1992, where a
small business is defined as a non-financial,
non-farm business employing fewer than 500
full-time equivalent employees. The sample
was stratified by nine Census regions, urban
or rural location,7 employment size, race, and
~Foradetaileddescriptionof the 1993 NSSBF, see
Cole and Woken (1995). For a description of the 1987
NSSBF which was used by Petersen and Rajan (1994)
and Berger and Udell (1995), see Elliehausen and
Wolken (1990).
7The data were stratified by urban and rural loca-
tion, and this suggests that statistical comparisons
should take account of this stratification. Thus, the sim-
ple statistics presented here should not be taken as es-
timates for the U.S. as a whole.
ethnicity. Data from the 1993 NSSBF are
broadly representative of approximately 5.0
million firms operating in the U.S. as of year-
end 1992.
The 1993 NSSBF provides information on
each firm’s balance sheet, income statement,
and credit history. The survey also collected
other characteristics of the firm-including
standard industrial classification, organization-
al form, and age—as well as demographic
characteristics of each firm’s primary owner,
including age, education, experience, and
credit history.
The survey also provides detailed infor-
mation about each firm’s most recent borrow-
ing experience (the experience may have oc-
curred from 1991–1994.), including whether
or not the firm applied for credit, the identity
and characteristics of the potential lender to
which the firm applied, what other financial
services (if any) the firm obtained from that
potential lender, whether the potential lender
denied or extended credit to the firm, and, if
the lender extended credit, the terms of the
loan.
In total, there are 4637 firms in the 1993
NSSBE Businesses located in rural areas ac-
counted for about 20 percent of respondents.
Table 3 contains a simple comparison of the
means of the sample, and I plan to discuss
only those differences between urban and rural
small businesses that seem likely to influence
the subsequent estimations. The subsequent
estimations take account of the sampling
weights from the survey, and thus they pro-
vide a more accurate comparison of the char-
acteristics of urban and rural borrowers.
As may be seen in the first few lines of
Table 3, owners of rural small businesses in
the survey had significantly less schooling
than their urban counterparts, even though
both urban and rural owners were roughly the
same age (50 years). Rural small businesses in
the survey were significantly smaller in terms
of either sales or assets, even though the rural
small businesses had existed for two more
years, on average, than urban respondents. Ru-
ral survey participants were significantly less
likely to have had trade credit denied or to
have been delinquent on business obligations,Walraven: Rural Banks Involved in Mergers 207
Table 3. Selected Characteristics of Urban and Rural Small Businesses
Urban Rural T-statistic for
Variable Responclents Respondents difference
Number of Cases 3702 935
Education: High School no more (percent) 21.5 33,9 80**
Education: Some Post College (percent) 22.8 15.2 –5,1**
Owner’s Age (years) 50.0 50.8 1.9
Market HHI 1297 2779 47.6**
Business Sales (million $) 3.9 3.0 _20*
Business Assets (million $) 1.8 1.2 –2.6**
Firm Age (years) 14.9 16.9 4,1**
Trade Credit Denied Recently? (percent yes) 8.1 4.9 –3.3**
Business Delinquencies (percent yes) 20.8 16.0 –3.3**
Personal Delinquencies of Owner (percent yes) 13.4 10.8 –2.1*
Firm Leverage 67,8 58.8 –1.8
Firm ROA 1.1 0.8 –1,6
Partnership (percent yes) 7.2 7.7 0.6
Corporation (percent yes) 62.7 52.1 –60**
Avoided Credit for Fear of Rejection (percent yes) 27.8 16,8 –69**
Sought Credit (percent yes) 42.5 46.3 2.1*
** Stati~ticallY significant at the l-percent level.
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
and the principal owner of a rural small busi-
ness was less likely to have personal credit
delinquencies. Rural respondents were a bit
less levered financially and had a slightly low-
er return on assets, although neither of these
variables differed significantly. A much lower
portion of rural respondents reported having
avoided credit for fear of having the applica-
tion rejected, and a slightly higher proportion
of rural small businesses actually had sought
credit. Generalizing a bit from these results,
rural small business in the survey tended to be
smaller, but both the firm and the principle
owner had, on average, a better credit record
than urban firms.
Because this session is particularly fo-
cussed on rural areas, another way of exam-
ining these survey data is to look at the gross
experience of the 46 percent of rural firms in
the survey that reported having applied for
credit at any time from 1991 through 1994.
As Table 4 shows, rural small business bor-
rowers whose application for credit was turned
down tended to be significantly smaller and
younger firms. In addition, those denied also
were more likely to have been previously
turned down for trade credit and to have re-
ported business delinquencies as well as per-
sonal delinquencies by the principal owner.
Those small businesses that were unsuccessful
in obtaining their last loan also tended to be
less profitable and to have avoided seeking
credit because they feared being rejected. Gen-
eralizing a bit, it appears that those rural firms
that were unsuccessful in gaining a loan tend-
ed to have the sort of red flags in their busi-
ness and personal histories that one might ex-
pect to make lenders worry about repayment
prospects for the loan.
Estimating the Probability that an
Application is Accepted
Sorting through the 1993 NSSBF and inter-
preting the large amount of data collected in
the survey has generated a large number of
papers (see, for example, the references in
Cole et. al. 1998 and Jayaratne and Wolken
1998). In attempting to use these data to an-
alyze the firm’s most recent borrowing expe-
rience, a particular feature of the data collec-
tion immediately becomes apparent, and it
colors the analysis throughout this section. In
particular, the survey collects data only on the208 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 1999
Table 4. Selected Characteristics of Rural Small Firms That Sought Credit
Applications Applications T-Statisticfor
Variable Accepted Denied Difference
Number of Cases 389 44
Education: High School, No more (percent) 26.2 27.3 –0.1
Education: Some Post College (percent) 15.9 25.0 –1.5
Market HHI 2846 3036 –0.9
Business Sales (million $) 4.9 1.0 46**
Business Assets (million $) 2.0 0.6 4.1**
Firm Age (years) 16.6 12.2 3.1*
Trade Credit Denied Recently? (percent yes) 5.4 25.0 –2.9**
Business Delinquencies (percent yes) 15.9 56.8 –5.3**
Personal Delinquencies of Owner (percent yes) 8.2 45.5 –4.8**
Firm Leverage 70.4 75.8 –0.5
Firm ROA 45.4 23.1 20*
Partnership (percent yes) 8.5 9.1 –0.1
Corporation (percent yes) 62.7 56.8 0.7
Avoided Credit for Fear of Rejection (percent yes) 13.6 65.9 _7.o**
Owner’s Age (years) 50.0 47.5 1.4
** ,Statistically significant at the l-percent level.
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
most recent loan, and we have little informa-
tion regarding an applicant’s search for credit.
The nature of this problem might be illus-
trated by considering an applicant who on the
survey reported receiving a loan but previous-
ly had been denied numerous times. We can-
not distinguish this applicant from another
who had been denied only once before obtain-
ing the loan. Similarly, we cannot know for
those denied if the denial reported was the last
in a series of denials or the first.
Keeping this important caveat regarding
the collection of the survey data in mind, I
proceed in much the same manner as in Cole
and Walraven (1998). Many of the variables
are similar—the main improvement is that the
characteristics of the geographic banking mar-
kets are specified much more completely. In
the 1998 paper, the location of the bank was
taken to be the location of the head office, a
particularly dubious assumption when one
considers a large, multi-state banking opera-
tion. In contrast, many of the variables that
describe the market structure in this paper are
tied directly to specific banking markets, while
other variables describe changes in the orga-
nizational structure of the bank without regard
to the location of the bank. To illustrate, with
the current data set I have information on
changes in each individual geographic market,
such as closures, banks that became branches,
and the like. I also have included variables that
describe changes in the organizational struc-
ture of the bank that may have left the banking
market variables unchanged, such as the pos-
sible effect on a banking subsidiary when its
distant high holder is purchased by another
holding company.
In general, I estimate a logit equation of
the binary variable that is true if the small
business received a loan, and null if it failed
to obtain the loan. I base this equation on sev-
eral characteristics of the banking market and
the particular bank office where the small firm
sought credit, characteristics of the economic
environment of the area where the firm is lo-
cated, characteristics of the firm, and charac-
teristics of the principal owner. I describe each
of the variables in the course of discussing the
regression results in the next section.
Because most small businesses reported
that they had not sought credit during the three
years preceding the survey, it seems quite pos-
sible that our sample of loan applications may
be affected by a selection bias. In other words,
the firms that applied for a loan may have dif-Walraven: Rural Banks Involved in Mergers 209
fered fundamentally from firms that did not
apply, and this difference may have affected
our parameter estimates in a systematic way.
An elegant description of this type of econo-
metric situation, as well as an effective intui-
tive remedy was first given in Heckrnan.
Following the general pattern of Heck-
man’s approach in our problem, we first use a
probit regression to estimate the probability
that the small business sought a loan in the
period covered by the survey. Then, we cal-
culate the inverse of Mill’s ratio (MR) for each
observation, which reflects the probability that
a small business applied for a loan from a
commercial bank, and includes this variable:
MR = [+(z,)]/[1 – ~(z,)],
where Zj is the predicted probability that re-
spondent j applied for a loan, and ~(.) and Q(.)
are, respectively, the density and the cumula-
tive distribution function for a standard normal
variable in the accepted/denied equation (the
primary equation of interest). The inclusion of
this variable purges the equation of selection
bias, allowing one to gain consistent estimates
of the parameters.
Our problem differs from the standard
Heckman formulation in two ways. First, the
equation of interest has a dependent variable
that only can take values of O or 1. Second,
as mentioned earlier in this section, one should
take account of the sample weights when es-
timating the parameters. While neither of these
deviations from the orthodox Heckman for-
mulation alters the consistency of the param-
eter estimates,g both complicate the estimation
of the appropriate standard errors of the esti-
mates. In fact, to the author’s knowledge, no
procedures are currently in place to estimate
standard errors in this situation.
When confronted with consistent parameter
estimates and difficult or even intractable ex-
pressions of the precision of the estimates, re-
searchers often resort to bootstrap-type pro-
cedures (Efron and Tibshirani), and we also
have adopted this plan. Thus, our strategy for
implementing a Heckman-style correction for
selection bias when the data come from a
stratified random sample and the dependent
variable of the equation of interest can take on
only a value of O or 1 is as follows. First,
estimate a survey weighted probit equation for
all 4637 observations using the svyprobt pro-
cedure that is available in Stata statistical soft-
ware (StataCorp). This gives a consistent es-
timate of the probability that a firm sought a
loan. Second, calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio
and include it in a survey weighted logit re-
gression estimated using svylogit, also avail-
able in Stata. These two steps yield consistent
estimates of the parameters. To get proper es-
timates of the standard errors of these param-
eter estimates, we repeated Steps 1 and 2 one
thousand times using a sample that was drawn
with replacement from the original 4637 ob-
servation dataset. As is standard in bootstrap
applications, the standard error of the mean
parameter estimate of these 1000 replications
is an estimate of the true standard error of the
parameter.y
Construction of the Banking Market
Variables
Much of this description of the data follows
that in Cole and Walraven (1998). We use four
indicator variables to characterize the merger
status of the bank that received the loan ap-
plication: (1) Acquirer Before Loan Applica-
tion indicates a bank that acquired another
bank during the 18 months prior to the loan
application. This is the period of adjustment
that most researchers have considered when
assessing the effects of mergers. (2) Acquirer
After Loan Application indicates a bank that
acquired another bank during the 18 months
subsequent to the loan application, This indi-
cator spans the time after a merger has been
announced, or possibly is in the works, and
XHere we assume that the sampling weights were
determined exogenously, That is, the size of the sam-
pling weights is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
likelihood that a small business will seek a loan.
gNote that each re-sample likely yielded a different
proportion of firms that sought a loan, as well as a
different pattern of weighting than was exhibited in the
original data set.210 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 1999
the date that it legally is completed. (3) Target
Before Loan Application indicates a bank that
was acquired by another bank during the 18
months prior to the loan application. And (4)
Target After Loan Application indicates a
bank that was acquired by another bank during
the 18 months subsequent to the loan appli-
cation.
By matching the bank number with data
from the Call report, we were able to construct
several measures of banking performance that
might be expected to affect lending decisions.
I use (the log of) bank assets, Equity/Assets,
Delinquent Loans/Total Loans, and Loan Loss
Allowance/Total Loans for each bank where a
small business respondent reported seeking a
loan, I also include a dummy variable for
membership in a bank holding company, and
I include the set of banking performance var-
iables that are aggregated to the holding com-
pany level. (I set to zero all of the holding
company variables for an independent bank.)
Using some of the data generated from the
analysis in the first several sections, one also
can construct variables specific to the geo-
graphic banking market of the firm. Number
of Banking Oj6ces in a A4arket represents a
count of the commercial banks, thrifts, savings
banks, and the offices of any of these financial
institutions that are open in the county or met-
ropolitan area of the small business on the day
that the respondent applied for the loan. Num-
ber of Closures of Banks/O fices represents the
sum of closures from January 1992 until the
day of the loan application in the banking mar-
ket of the small business. Number oj A4ergers
in a Market is the count of the commercial
banks (not other types of targets or of branch-
es) that were targets of mergers in the banking
market from January 1992 until the day of the
loan application.
One can use the NSSBF data to construct
a variable indicating whether a respondent
who reported seeking a loan had maintained
some sort of banking relationship with the in-
stitution where the loan was sought. Because
a market that had experienced a great deal of
structural change might be expected to have a
larger number of these types of borrowers, I
constructed a market variable Disruption that
is the interaction of this “no relationship” var-
iable with the sum of closures and mergers in
the market.
Estimation Results
Tables 5 and 6 give the results of estimating
a single equation using the Heckman adjust-
ment. Table 5 shows the parameter estimates
from the initial probit equation, which show
the contribution of a set of firm, market, and
bank variables on the probability that a sample
respondent had sought a loan.
The only one of the banking market vari-
ables that seemed correlated with whether the
owner of a small business sought a loan was
the number of banking offices that were open
in the market. However, the negative sign in-
dicates that firms located in markets with more
banking offices were less likely to seek a loan.
Several of the firm characteristics seemed
to be significantly correlated with the decision
to seek a loan. Larger firms and those with
more sales were more likely to seek a loan.
Older firms were less likely to seek a loan,
perhaps reflecting some dependence on accu-
mulated retained earnings. Firms that used fi-
nancial services from a greater variety of
sources were more likely to seek a loan, per-
haps reflecting better relationships with poten-
tial lenders. Finally, rural small firms in the
sample were more likely to seek a loan than
their urban counterparts.
Among those characteristics of the primary
owner of the firm, those who recently had ob-
tained new equity from relatives were more
likely to seek a bank loan, while those with
no more than a high school education were
less likely to seek credit. Those owners who
reported having avoided applying for a loan
during the past three years because they feared
that they might be rejected were more likely
to report seeking a loan on the survey.
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates
from the logistic regression of whether or not
a small business was denied credit on a num-
ber of characteristics of the firm, the market,
the principal owner, the bank that received the
application, and the probability that the firmWalraven: Rural Banks Involved in Mergers 211
Table 5. Parameter Estimates of First Step Probit Regression Factors Affecting Whether a
Firm Sotwht a Loan
Viiriable
—
Number of Banking Offices in the Market
Number of Closures of Banks/Branches
Number of Mergers in Market
Log of Annual Sales
Log of Firm Assets
Business’s Delinquencies
Trade Credit Denied
Log of Firm Age
Number of Sources for Financial Services





Banking Market Concentration (HHI- 1992) (*0.0001)
Employment Growth in Area
Urban Area
Equity Recently Raised from Existing Owners Their Relatives
New Equity Recently Raised from Other Sources
Not AppIied in the Past Three Years Fearing Denial













































** Statistically significant at the 1-percent level,
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
applied for credit that was estimated in the
previous probit equation.
Among these variables, the number of
sources of financial services, the firm size and
annual sales, whether the respondent had a pri-
or relationship with the bank before requesting
the loan, and whether the firm was located in
a rural or urban area significantly affected the
probability that a small business’s application
for credit was accepted. Larger firms and those
with a greater variety of providers of financial
services all had a significantly higher proba-
bility that their loan application was accepted.
In addition, urban firms, other things equal,
had a higher probability of having their loan
request turned down. Firms with no previous
relationship with the lender were significantly
less likely to obtain the loan that they request-
ed. The parameter on Lambda, the probability
that the firm sought credit, was highly signif-
icant, indicating that the data were substan-
tially affected by selection bias.
These regressions included applications for
all types of loans, and one possible problem
might be that loans for working capital, the
most common type of loan reported by small
businesses in the survey, differ fundamentally
from other types of loans to businesses. Re-
peating the above regressions only for work-
ing capital loans yielded roughly the same pat-
terns of significance, except that the parameter
estimate for urban became insignificant.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper employed a variety of sources of
data and a number of methods to describe ru-
ral lending markets. The data, where possible,
spanned the period 1992 through the present,
giving some perspective on changes in the na-
ture of banking in the recent past. Over this
interval there has been a pronounced trend to-
wards affiliation of banks, both urban and ru-
ral, with holding companies. While most rural
targets of takeovers already were members of
holding companies, the increasing prevalence212 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 1999
Table 6. Logistic Regression Results (Observations are weighted by sampling weights. T-
valttes are from bootstraps of size 100)
Variable Estimate T-statistic
Merger Variables (at bank that receives loan application)
Acquirer Before Loan Application
Acquirer After Loan Application
Target Before Loan Application
Target After Loan Application
Market Variables
Number of Banking Offices in a Market
Number of Closures of Banks/Offices
Number of Mergers in a Market
Employment Growth in Area
Banking Market Concentration (HHI- 1992) (*0,0001)
Urban Location of Firm
Business Variables
Disruption (Interaction of No Relationship and (Mergers + Closures)




Length of Pre-Existing Relationship With Lender
Number of Sources for Financial Services
Leverage
Return on Assets
Log of Firm Age





Characteristics of the Bank Receiving the Application
Membership in a Bank Holding Company
Log of Bank Assets
Equity/Assets (Bank)
Delinquencies/Total Loans (Bank)
Loan Loss Allowance/Total Loans (Bank)
Log Assets (Holding Company)
Equity/Assets (Holding Company)
Delinquencies/Total Loans (Holding Company)






































































** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
* Statistical y significant at the 5 percent level.
of bank holding companies in rural areas could the diversification of risks and the like that this
change lending patterns as the degree of local trend provides rural banks is a topic worthy of
control of lending decisions diminishes. Of several research projects.
course, the trend towards holding company Likely coming as a surprise to few readers,
structure among rural banks is not new, and rural targets of bank mergers were smallerWalraven: Raral Banks Involved in Mergers 213
than urban targets. Rural targets also were
more profitable and had lower rates of delin-
quency. Nevertheless, rural targets of mergers
held a significantly smaller portion of their as-
sets as loans, perhaps explaining some of their
attraction to buyers.
The second section of the paper looked at
the level and changes in banking market con-
centration from mid 1992 until mid 1997.
Concentration in rural banking markets in-
creased a bit more than in urban markets over
this five-year span. However, the degree of
concentration in the least competitive rural
markets improved a bit–that is, the value of
the upper percentiles of the distribution fell
back towards the median. One topic that
seems a fruitful area for future research is the
relative effect of de now banks on the con-
centration in urban and rural areas. Another is
the effect of technological change in the fi-
nancial industry, where standardization of loan
terms, securitization of loans, and innovations
such as electronic banking may gradually
make geographic measures of competition
such as the HHI obsolete.
The final section of the paper looked spe-
cifically at rural borrowers using data from the
1993 NSSBE The model of credit search used
in this overview found some evidence that al-
though rural small businesses were less likely
to apply for a loan, those that did were more
likely to have their application accepted than
urban firms that applied for credit. That is, af-
ter one controlled for characteristics of the
small business firm, the principal owner, and
the banking market; the urban or rural location
of the small business had a significant effect
on both the probability that a firm sought a
loan and on the likelihood that the loan was
granted. Of the variables constructed to de-
scribe banking markets, only the number of
banking offices had a significant effect on the
likelihood that a small business sought a loan,
and the data indicate that the more banking
offices in a market, the less likely a small busi-
ness is to seek a loan. After one adjusts for
the probability that a firm seeks a loan, the
size and annual sales of the small business, the
number of sources of financial services that
the firm maintained, and whether the firm had
maintained a relationship with the bank that
received the loan application also had a sig-
nificant effect on whether the firm was granted
the loan.
One shouldn’t read too much into these re-
sults, The sample seems fairly small-only 44
loan requests originating from rural small
businesses were reported to have been turned
down in the survey. However, keeping in mind
the relative paucity of rural loans and the sur-
vey problems mentioned in the paper, larger
firms and those that maintained banking rela-
tionships seemed the least likely to be refused
a loan. Furthermore, there was some tentative
evidence that rural small businesses were
slightly less likely to be turned down for a
loan, although they were less likely to apply,
suggesting some self-selection.
Of course, these results may be addressing
a different point than some specialists in rural
development might prefer. Namely, many of
the most notable features of rural small busi-
nesses are those that tend to lower the joint
probability (the probability that the loan is
granted conditional on the probability that
they applied) that they receive a bank loan.
Just reviewing some of the list of significant
variables in the probit equation, smaller firms
and those with fewer sources of financial ser-
vices were significantly less likely to seek a
loan. Some observers might assert that these
are inherent characteristics of rural small busi-
nesses.
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